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INDIANS AND LANDS RESERVED FOR
THE INDIANS:
OFF-LIMITS TO THE PROVINCES?
By PATRICIA HUGHES*

Although the federal government has jurisdiction over Indians and
reserves, there has been an "area" allocated to the provinces with respect to
the application of their laws to Indians; yet, it can be argued, the provinces'
area can be so strictly limited by the way in which their legislation may be
characterized that it becomes very narrow indeed.
The exclusive power held in relation to "Indians and the Lands Reserved
for Indians" by the federal government might have been exercised in a manner
designed to protect and enhance native status. Yet section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 18671 has not served that function; often it has been used to
diminish and demean native status. The poverty, high unemployment, low
education levels and psychological and politicial alienation of the majority of
the members of our native communities are witness to federal failure.
Politically, wardship and independent cultural and political survival are by
definition incompatible. Although there are exceptions to this unhappy and
disgraceful picture of native life - bands grown rich from the fortuitous
placement of their reserves on ground protecting oil or bands who own shopping centres or ski resorts - clearly federal occupation of this field has not
been a particularly beneficial one.
The federal-provincial interplay in the application of their respective laws
to native peoples symbolizes the conflict which pervades native life: how to
combine the native distinctiveness with the reality of surrounding white
culture. Put another way, would the reserve immune from provincial regulation be an oasis or a barren island? MacLaren J.A. in R. v. Hill2 would answer
that the latter would be the case: exempt from provincial obligations, Indians
would also be exempt from the benefits and would be relegated, except for the
"few matters" within federal scope, to "the condition and rights of their
ancestors when this country was first discovered." 3
Another observer might note that native peoples would be "relegated" to
the status of an independent and self-sufficient peoples. The NaturalParents
case, 4 discussed below, 5 seems to echo this argument, albeit in a more
© Copyright, 1982, Patricia Hughes.
* Articling Student at Laskin, Jack and Harris, Toronto.
130-31 vict., c. 3 as am. by item I of Sched. to the ConstitutionAct, 1982, Sched. B
of the CanadaAct1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).
2(1907), 15 O.L.R. 406 (C.A.).
3
Id. at 411.
4
Natural Parents v. Superintendent of Child Welfare, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 751, 60
D.L.R. (3d) 148, [1976] 1 W.W.R. 699.

5See text accompanying notes 24-38, 154-172.
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sophisticated way, where a concern is expressed that native children be able to
benefit from provincial adoption laws. Accepting the view that native people
would suffer without the benefits of provincial laws, however, it could be
argued that this view would be true only if the federal government did not fill
the vacuum: although the federal government could exercise its power in such
an instance, it might not find it practical to do so. If nothing else, permitting
the application of provincial laws is an expedient way for the federal government to carry out its responsibilities under section 91(24), particularly for Indians off the reserves. For example, the Indian Act 6 contains provision for
regulating traffic on the reserve 7 but the federal government has never attempted to create chaos by regulating traffic for Indians off the reserve.
The impact of provinical legislation is seen rather differently by other
commentators. Douglas Sanders suggests that the way in which we define
"reserve" will help determine whether provincial laws should apply. If the
reserve is treated as a distinct social and political community, few provincial
laws will apply; if it is considered to be merely a geographical entity, the only
non-applicable provincial legislation will be that concerned with land use. 8 It
shall be argued that "land use" is a large enough category to swallow provincial legislation whole. From this perspective, the application of provincial
law may be the manifestation of the encroachment by white society upon the
protected reserve.
Another, more prosaic, aspect to consider is the federal-provincial struggle for power. The federal government appears to be in possession of the
elements necessary for success since it has power over "Indians and the Lands
reserved for Indians" (both of which go beyond the borders of the specified
reserves 9) and it has proclaimed the operation of that power (at least in regard
to reserves) through the Indian Act. Against that show of strength, the provinces must assert their own presence, always conscious of the necessity of overcoming the presumption of federal jurisdiction (and, no doubt, conscious,
too, of not taking too much actual responsibility for native rights). Section 88
of the Indian Act formulates the position of the province. It cannot be ignored
6R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6.
e.g., R. v. Johns (1962), 39 W.W.R. 49, 33 C.C.C. 43, 38 L.R. 148 (Sask.
C.A.); R. v. Marshall (1979), 31 N.S.R. (2d) 530, 52 A.P.R. 530 (C.A.); R. v. Two
7See,

young men (1979), 16 A.R. 413 (C.A.). In the last case, the accused was charged under

provincial legislation which the Court held applied to Indians on Reserves, while in the

first two cases, the accused was charged under federal legislation. Thp distinction lies in
the Courts' interpretations of the relevant words in the IndianAct Traffic Regulations.
The Court in Two young men construed them narrowly in order to exclude incorporation of the provincial legislation by section 88.
8
Sanders, Hunting Rights - ProvincialLaws - Application on Indian Reserves
(1973-74) 38 Sask. L. Rev. 234 at 239. Sanders' case comment on Cardinalv. A.G.
Alta., [1974] S.C.R. 695, [1973] 6 W.W.R. 205, 13 C.C.C. (2d) 1, is a response to the
ways in which the Chief Justice and Martland J. define "reserve" in that case, discussed
in greater detail at text accompanying notes 190-213.
'The federal government has jurisdiction over Indians on and off Reserves, and
land reserved for Indians includes at least that territory covered by The Royal Proclamation, 1763 (Imp.), R.S.C. 1970, Appendix II, No. 1: St. Catherine'sMilling and
Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1887), 13 S.C.R. 577 at 617, aff'd (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46,4
Cart. 107.
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from a political standpoint that section 88 is a statement designed by one
adversary to shape the parameters of the other's aggression. Its ultimate meaning remains, of course, with the courts. Section 88 reads as follows:
Subject to the terms of any treaty and any other Act of Parliament of Canada, all
laws of general application from time to time in force in any province are applicable to and in respect of Indians in the province, except to the extent that such
laws are inconsistent with this Act or any order, rule, regulation or by-law made
thereunder, and except to the extent that such laws make provision for any matter
for which provision is made by or under this Act.
Thus laws of general application in the province are applicable to Indians
except as limited by the other provisions of section 88: they are subject to
treaties and any federal legislation concerned with Indians and reserves, and
void to the extent of any inconsistency with the Indian Act (and regulations
and band council by-laws made under it); furthermore, such laws are not valid
or are inoperative in their application to Indians if they make provision for
anything for which provision is made by or under the IndianAct, whether they
are inconsistent or not.
This article will examine the concept of characterization in the interaction
between federal and provincial legislation as they apply to Indians and
Reserves paying particular, but not exclusive, attention to section 88. The process of characterization lies at the heart of section 88 and thus central to the extent to which provincial legislation is held to apply to Indians. The extent of
provincial presence in this area is important, as shown briefly above, from the
symbolic perspective of defining reserves, the political perspective of determining the balance of power between the federal and provincial governments and
from the legal perspective of interpreting section 88.
II.

CHARACTERIZATION: THE ESSENCE OF SECTION 88
The first form of categorization is that which always arises when one level
of government complains that its jurisdiction is being invaded by the other
level.' 0 The test focuses on determining the subject matter or "pith and
substance" of the legislation and applies to both federal and provincial legislation. The concern of this paper is less with the normal pith and substance
characterization than with other types of categorization to which a piece of
provincial legislation passing the pith and substance test will be subject.
Assuming a particular piece of provincial legislation passes the pith and
substance test, then, it must be examined further to determine whether the subject matter comes within the purview of the IndianAct; how rigidly or liberally
the provisions of the Indian Act are interpreted will have a crucial bearing on
the outcome at that stage.
10 It is not suggested here that characterization is not useful in other legislative
areas. An indication that it is useful can be seen from attempts at "colouring", for example, when legislation purports to be about a matter within the enacting body's
jurisd ction but is actually in relation to a matter within the other government's jurisdiction. Indeed, it could be argued that all constitutional interjurisdictional interpretation
is in its essence an exercise in characterization. Rather, here the exercise is being carried
out in relation to the interplay between s. 91(24) and relevant s. 92 subject matters; it is
done, however, on the premise that characterization is a particularly significant tool in
this area.
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Beyond the "Indian Act test", provincial legislation may be analyzed to
determine whether it can be characterized as "in relation to" land use; if it is,
it follows that it may have no application to reserves. Finally, the effect of section 88 itself on the status of provincial legislation must be considered: does it
referentially incorporate provincial legislation or give it power to apply expropio vigore, or its own force? Although this question appears to have been settled in favour of the ex propio vigore position, a substantial minority of the
judiciary and commentators are steadfast in the view that section 88 referentially incorporates provincial legislation. As will be discussed below, l l they
consider incorporation "saves" provincial legislation which, without incorporation, would not apply at all.
It is contended here that the "appropriate" application of the characterization principles outlined below could effectively bar the province from virtually any jurisdiction over Indians, especially on Reserves; by "any jurisdiction" is meant any jurisdiction which would flow naturally from the exercise
of the province's section 92 powers as an incidental effect (that is, there is no
claim here that the provinces have any power over Indians or Reserves comparable to the federal section 91(24) power). The "characterization principles"
are as follows:
a) If the particular provincial legislation in dispute can be characterized
as "in relation to" Indians or Indian lands, the pith and substance test
would, of course, find it ultra vires as encroaching directly on
s. 91(24);
b) If the provincial legislation is not in relation to Indians or Indian lands,
but would "impair" the status of Indians, it will be declared ultra vires
insofar as it applies to Indians;
c) If the provincial legislation is within the scope of section 92 and if it is
of general application, it will be tested against the various limitations
in section 88 (that is, is the subject matter dealt with in a treaty or is
there extant a band council by-law on the subject, etc?) and it will be
declared void to the extent that it is subject to the limitations (or to the
extent the questions in parentheses are answered in the affirmative);
d) If the provincial legislation concerns a subject for which provision is
made by or under the IndianAct, it will be declared void to that extent,
both by virtue of section 88 and by the paramountcy doctrine;
e) If the provincial legislation can be characterized as relating to land use,
it will be void in its application to Indian Reserves by virtue of section
88; and
f) If the provincial legislation escapes the net of the foregoing tests, it will
be applied as federal law if section 88 does in fact referentially incorporate provincial legislation;
g) Finally, even a provincial law which escapes the federal net and is not
applied as a federal law must pass the challenge of the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms,' 2 although this requirement must be met by
"See Part E.
12

ConstitutionAct, 1982 Sched. B of the CanadaAct 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).
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federal legislation, as well, of course, and is thus of a somewhat different nature than the principles outlined above in which provincial
and federal legal capacities are in some sense pitted against each other.
That the application of these principles to provincial legislation carries
with it the potential usurpation of almost all provincial power in regard to Indians and Reserves is evident in the cases in which the principles are employed,
either explicitly or implicitly.
A.

The Firstand SecondPrinciples: The Pith and Substance and Impairment
Tests
If the provincial legislation in dispute can be characterized as "in relation to" Indians or Indian lands, the pith and substance test would find it ultra vires as encroaching directly on section 91(24).
This first principle is a common principle of constitutional interpretation.
When legislation (of either level of government) is impugned as being ultra
vires, the question addressed is "what is the purpose of this legislation?" If its
purpose is within the enacting body's jurisdiction, it is intra vires even if it
would have an incidental effect on something within the other government's
competence; at least, this is so assuming that a "singling out" has not occurred
behind a veil of general purpose. For example, the provincial legislature may
pass a law which deals with the control of property (so that property could not
be used to propogate a particular political doctrine); the courts may strike it
down as really being in relation to freedom of speech, a federal matter. 13 The
first principle simply says, then, that any provincial law, the real purpose of
which is to legislate in relation to Indians or Reserves will be struck down as
ultra vires, no matter what its ostensible purpose. Apart from acknowledging
the general difficulty of actually determining the "pith and substance" or
"real purpose" of any piece of legislation, nothing more need be said
specifically about its operation at this point and this first principle can be examined in company with the second principle which concerns impairment of
status:
If the provincial legislation is not in relation to Indians or Indian lands, but would
"impair" the status of Indians, it will be declared ultra vires insofar as it purports
to apply to Indians.

To be applicable to Indians, provincial laws must be laws of "general application", that is, applicable to everyone in the province. If a provincial law
affects only Indians, it would intrude on the section 91(24) power, and clearly
be ultra vires because of that; Mr. Justice Dickson seems to go beyond that in
Kruger and Manuel v. The Queen14, however, to state that a provincial law
which falls short of affecting only Indians may also be ultravires as it purports
to apply to Indians if it "impairs" Indian status.
Mr. Justice Dickson stated that there were two indicia of laws of general
application: they must apply uniformly throughout the territory and must not
be "in relation to" one class in object or purpose. 15 The law might affect one
3
Switzman v. Elbing, [1937] S.C.R. 285, 7 D.L.R. (2d) 337, 117 C.C.C. 129.
14[1978] 1 S.C.R. 104, [1977] 4 W.W.R. 300, 34 C.C.C. (2d) 377.
"Id. at 110 (S.C.R.), 304 (W.W.R.), 381 (C.C.C.).
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person or group more seriously than it does others, but it cannot impair the
status or capacity of a particular group, even if it is an enactment "in relation
to" another matter clearly within the enacting body's jurisdiction. 16 The Court
was not provided with "clear evidence" that the status of Indians had been impaired by the Wildlife Act, 17 the legislation then under scrutiny, or by the opposition of interests of conservationists and Indians "in such a way as to
favour the claims of the former." 18 The Wildlife Act, 19 then, fulfils both
criteria of a law of general application as set out by Dickson J. and this, for
Mr. Justice Dickson, decides the case.
What is not decided, however, is just what "impairment of status"
means. Mr. Justice Dickson's indicia can be interpreted to mean that even if a
provincial law which is otherwise valid has merely the incidentaleffect of impairing Indian status, it will be held ultra vires to that extent, at least. Yet in
the earlier case of Canadian Indemnity Co. v. Attorney-General of British
Columbia,20 where the provincial Autoplan virtually eliminated federally incorporated insurance companies, the plan was held to be valid because it came
within the province's jurisdiction under section 92(13) of the ConstitutionAct,
186721; within its jurisdiction the province can regulate a particular business or
activity and a federal coporation is not exempt from that. The concern, said
the Court, is with purpose and not effect. Mr. Justice Dickson's indiciarefer
to effect, not purpose, and seem also to go beyond the singling out test; from
his perspective, there does not have to be a singling out for the provincial
legislation to be invalid, there merely has to be an impairing effect on native
status.
It should be pointed out, too, that a provincial law which is intended to
benefit Indians (or, more neutrally, does not have either the purpose or effect
of impairing status) will be declared invalid if it purports to affect Indians
specifically. For example, dicta in the NaturalParents22 case made it clear that
a provision in the British Columbia Adoption Act 23 which stated that the Act
would not affect the Indian status of a native child adopted by white people
was either ineffective or ultra vires;24 that provision was intended to protect,
and would, if valid, have the effect of preserving, Indian status.
25
On the other hand, Mr. Justice Beetz suggests in the Natural Parents
16id.
17S.B.C. 1966, c. 55, s. 4(1)(c), now R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 433, s. 3(l)(c).
18Supra note 14, at 112 (S.C.R.), 306 (W.W.R.), 382 (C.C.C.).'
19 S.B.C. 1966, c. 55, now R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 433.
20 [1977] 2 S.C.R. 504, [1976] 5 W.W.R. 748, 30 C.P.R. (2d) 1.
2130-31 Vict., c. 3 as am. by item 1 of Sched. to the Constitution Act, 1982,
Sched. B of the CanadaAct 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).
22 Supra note 4.
23
R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 4, s. 10, as am. by S.B.C. 1973, c. 95, s. 1, now R.S.B.C. 1979,
c. 4, s. 11.
24Supra note 4 at 775 (S.C.R.)
166 (D.L.R.) 718 (W.W.R.) per Martland J., 787
(S.C.R.), 175 (D.L.R.), 721 (W.W.R.) per Beetz J. and 764 (S.C.R.), 156 (D.L.R.), 707
(W.W.R.) per Laskin L.J. (who did not actually rule on the point).
25id.
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case that status could be attacked quite seriously without provincial legislation
being declared invalid. He states in dictum that:
Even if one assumes that the child would lose his Indian status as a consequence of
the adoption order, I fail to see in what respect this would conflict with the Indian
Act. There could be no conflict either by way of outright repugnancy or by way of

occupation of the field since the IndianAct, silent as it is on the conditions, for26
malities and effects of legal adoption, does not even purport to occupy the field.

Read narrowly, this obiter dictum could be seen as referring only to the question of inconsistency with the Indian Act, that is, there may be other reasons
why affecting Indian status would make the order invalid. Read more broadly,
it could mean that impairment of status would not, in Mr. Justice Beetz's
view, automatically render the provincial Adoption Act 27 ultra vires as it purported to apply to Indians, although it should be pointed out that the Court
did not find that status was in fact affected by the Adoption Act. 28 If the broad
interpretation of Beetz J.'s obiter dictum is the correct one, it will be noted
that the impairment/general application test enunciated by Mr. Justice
Dickson is a greater threat to provincial legislation than the position intimated
by Mr. Justice Beetz in NaturalParents29 which deals with the issue more narrowly through the inconsistency with or provision by the Indian Act tests explicitly included in section 88.
Beetz J. also refers to the relationship between status and marriage, the
solemnization of the latter being within provincial jurisdiction.3" He refers to
failure to observe provincial solemnization requirements as affecting Indian
status. If it is, in fact, Beetz J.'s point that marriage can affect status, it cannot
be considered as an illustration of the ability of provincial legislation to affect
status or indeed impair it and yet still be intra vires; the impact on status
derives directly and explicitly from the Indian Act in that case, not from provincial legislation. One wonders, too, whether an incidental effect on one person (or relatively small number of persons) might be considered differently
than a wholesale impairment of status, although it is submitted that no such
distinction should be made.
The other (and perhaps most basic) question raised in relation to the impairment test is, of course, what constitutes status itself?. Is status meant to be
legal, political, social or psychological? The Supreme Court
has addressed this
31
question, albeit obliquely, and is divided on the matter.
The issue of impairment of status was central to the Natural Parents32
case. In that case, a white couple had applied to adopt an Indian child. The
trial judge was willing on the merits to allow the adoption without the consent
of the natural parents but he felt constrained by what he saw to be an inconsistency between the British Columbia Adoption Act 33 and the Indian Act: he
261Id. at 784-85 (S.C.R.), 173
27R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 4, now

(D.L.R.), 719 (W.W.R.).
R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 4.
2
R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 4., now R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 4.
29
Supra note 26.
30

Supra note 4, at 786 (S.C.R.), 174 (D.L.R.), 720 (W.W.R.).

31Id.
32

33

Id.
R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 4, now R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 4.
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believed the child's native status would be obliterated by the operation of the
provincial statute which provided for the cessation of all ties between the child
and natural parents. 34 The British Columbia Court of Appeal held that Indian
status survived despite adoption with the result that the Adoption Act, as a law
and was
of general application, applied to the adoption of Indian children
35
"blunted" only to the extent of inconsistency with the IndianAct.
All nine members of the Supreme Court held that the child's status was
not lost through adoption by non-Indians, nicely avoiding the impairment
issue. Chief Justice Laksin did attempt, however, to make "Indianness" or
cultural status the pivot determining whether provincial legislation would apply of its own force, to Indians. Adoption, he said, speaking for Judson,
Spence and Dickson JJ., goes to the very important concept of "Indianness",
thereby striking "at a relationship integral to a matter outside of provincial
competence." 36 The Adoption Act 37 could not, therefore, apply to Indians of
its own force: "It is difficult to conceive what would be left of exclusive
federal power in relation to Indians if such provincial legislation was held to
apply to Indians." ' 38 This notion of "Indianness" would permit a very wide
application of the impairment test and, consequently, of the section 91(24)
power.
The same issue was discussed in FourB Manufacturing,39 the most recent
Supreme Court case in the series dealing with the application of provincial law
to Indians. It concerned the application of Ontario labour relations legislation
to a business on a reserve. Four B was a company incorporated in Ontario,
owned by four brothers, all members of the Band on whose Reserve the
business operated. The company's existence on the Reserve was permitted by a
three year renewable permit pursuant to the Indian Act and it benefitted from
federal loans available to Indians. Although it employed Indians for the most
part (forty-eight employees were Indians), it also employed ten former Band
members and ten non-Indians. The business had nothing to do with Indian
culture or anything similar: it made uppers for Bata shoes. The employees
sought certification under the Ontario LabourRelations Act;4° the company
argued that the Act did not apply because the company and its employees were
within exclusive federal competence by virtue of section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867.4 1 (It is perhaps worth noting, as did the Court, that the Band
itself had considered forming the company but had decided against it; only
then had the brothers gone ahead with the venture on an individual basis.)
There was, then, a great deal of "Indianness" connected with this venture in
14[1974] 1 W.W.R. 19 sub nom. Re Birth Registration No. C7-09-022272
(B.C.S.C.).
35 44 D.L.R. (3d) 718, [1974] 3 W.W.R. 363, 14 R.F.L. 396 (B.C.C.A.).
36
Supra note 4, at 761 (S.C.R.), 154 (D.L.R.), 704 (W.W.R.).
37
R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 4., now R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 4.
38
Supra note 4, at 761 (S.C.R.), 154 (D.L.R.), 705 (W.W.R.).
39
FourB. ManufacturingLimited v. United Garment Workers of America, [1980],
385, 80 C.L.L.C. 14,006.
S.C.R.
40 1031, 102 D.L.R. (3d)
R.S.O. 1970, c. 232, now R.S.O. 1980, c. 228.
4130 & 31 Vict., c. 3 as am. by item 1 of Sched. to the Constitution Act, 1982,
Sched. B of the CanadaAct 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).
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one way or another; nevertheless, the Court held, with two Justices dissenting,
that the Ontario LabourRelationsAct 42 applied.
Chief Justice Laskin and Mr. Justice Ritchie were considerably more impressed than were their fellow members of the Court by the notion that the
combination of individual "Indian elements" in Four B made it "substantially
an enterprise 'of Indians for Indians on an Indian reserve'." 43 Incorporation
in Ontario was mere convenience but observance of section 18 of the Indian
Act (obtaining permission to operate the factory on the Reserve) and other sections of the Act (sections 28, 20(1) and 30) "manifest an exercise of federal
legislative authority in maintaining the Reserve for the use and benefit of Indians who are members of the Band for which the Reserve has been set
apart." 44 The federal subsidies and other factors, in their lordships' opinion,
made this a distinctly Indian entreprise and therefore a project which was subject to the CanadaLabour Code,45 not the Ontario LabourRelationsAct 46.
Most activities on the Reserve and most people's presence there occur
with the permission of the federal government or with its tacit acceptance. The
minority position in Four B Manufacturing47 (Laskin C.J. and Ritchie J.) if
carried to its logical conclusion, would have the Reserve itself treated as coming under section 91(24) for almost all purposes as long as Indians are involved
or the IndianAct is instrumental in the activity's taking place (that is, that permission is granted for the activity to take place on the Reserve). That is, in
fact, the Chief Justice's position, formulated in his "enclave" theory which49he
48
articulated in Cardinalv. A. G. Alberta and which will be discussed below.
The characterization of the matter by Beetz J. for the majority, took a
different tack. What is of concern here, he said, was not the civil rights of Indians but "the rights of Indians and non-Indians to associate with one another
for labour relations purposes, purposes which are not related to 'Indianness'." 50 There is, he said, nothing specifically Indian about the employer and
since neither Indian status nor rights closely connected with Indian status were
at stake, the right to regulate labour relations does not form an integral part of
federal jurisdiction over Indians and Indian lands. Four B Manufacturing cannot, from the majority's point of view, be characterized as a federal undertaking. The requirement of a permit is irrelevant since the company would need
one to operate on any Crown land and other companies receive federal subsidies without the federal government regulating their labour relations.
The FourB Manufacturing5l case is a difficult one. For the minority, the
location and ownership (by Indians) is more or less conclusive of the matter;
42

R.S.O. 1970, c. 2323, now R.S.O. 1980, c. 228.

43Supra

note 39, at 1039 (S.C.R.), 390 (D.L.R.), 26 (C.L.L.C.) per Laskin C.J.

44MId. at 1038 (S.C.R.), 3890-90 (D.L.R.), 25 (C.L.L.C.) per Laskin C.J.
45
R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1, s. 108, re-enacted by S.C. 1972, c. 18, s. 1.
46 R.S.O. 1970, c. 232, now R.S.O. 1980, c. 228.
47
Supra note 39.
48[1974] S.C.R. 695, [1975] 6 W.W.R., 13 C.C.C. (2d) 1.
49
See text accompanying notes 190-99, infra.
39, at 1047 (S.C.R.), 397 (D.L.R.), 21 (C.L.L.C.).
id.

50
Supra note
51

Indian Lands
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the added factors of the loan and predominance of Indian employees help to
make their conclusion firmer. For the majority, those aspects are not sufficient; rather, they are incidental to an otherwise "ordinary" company. For the
minority, the unit of analysis is Indians and "Indianness" in a general sense,
while for the majority, the unit of analysis is the company, not Indians or Indian land, and there is nothing in the operation of the company which makes it
federal. Section 108 of the CanadaLabourCode52 (which would apply if Four
B were a federal undertaking) is directed at federal activities, operations or
functions, 53and not at the position of individuals who might be termed
"federal".
In Whitebear Band Council v. CarpentersProvincial Council of Saskatchewan, 54 the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal attempts to limit the impact of
FourB Manufacturing55 on the ground that in Whitebear Band Council,56 the
band council itself is the employer. The Council had agreed with the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development to embark on the construction of homes (and related service works) on the reserve. The employees,
members of the reserve, were paid by the Council. The Saskatchewan Labour
Relations Board certified the applicant union to represent the carpenters involved on the project. The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, in an application
for judicial review, quashed the order of the Labour Relations Board. It found
that the band council, as a creature of federal legislation, imparted its federal
character to its construction project, an activity which could not be "separated
from the activity of the band council as a whole." 57 Nor does it matter whether
the federal government has legislated on the matter:
[W] here legislative jurisdiction in relation to a business, service, work or undertaking is exclusively conferred on Parliament, the regulation of the labour relations,
forming an integral part of the operation of such business, service, work or underthe effect of
taking, is not only beyond provincial jurisdiction but is immune5from
s
provincial law, irrespective of whether Parliament has legislated.
Although it is not clear that this immunity extends when legislative
authority is conferred otherwise than in relation to a business, service, work or
undertaking - as in relation to "Indians" or "Lands reserved for the Indians" - Cameron J.A. expresses some confidence that immunity rests on
the power over lands, rather than over Indians. But he does not have to decide
this point since the basis of his decision is the classification of the operations of
the band council, of which the construction project is only a part, as "a federal
work, undertaking or business".
Although Whitebear Band Council59 indicates how easily Four B
Manufacturing6° can be distinguished, it does not help us determine when
52

R.S.C. 1970, c. L-l, s. 108, re-enacted by S.C. 1972, c. 18, s. 1.
Supra note 39, at 1051 (S.C.R.), 400 (D.L.R.), 23 (C.L.L.C.).
14 [1982] 3 W.W.R. 554 (Sask. C.A.).
55
Supra note 39.
56
Supra note 54.
57
1Id.at 566.
5
1Id.at 567 per Cameron J.A. (emphasis in original).
59
53

Id.

I Supra note 39.
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status is impaired. For the majority in FourB, 61 "Indianness" or status must
mean something more than a physical involvement by Indians but what that
"something more" is, is-not clear. For Chief Justice Laskin, at least, "Indianness" has cultural components which allow him to attribute "Indianness" to
the very fact of being Indian in the racial sense or, perhaps, of being Indian on
a reserve. It almost seems that to apply provincial legislation under the circumstances of FourB Manufacturing62 or, as shall be seen, of Cardinal63 is to
detract from "Indianness", to impair status. Similarly, adoption by white
people carries with it the potential of loss of cultural ties and an impairment of
64
status, although not the loss of legal status, and therefore the Adoption Act
could not apply of its own force.
When we speak of a cultural or political "Indianness", we might well
consider that, historically, hunting and fishing rights have been integrally interwoven with Indian status and with Indian culture. Yet it is ironic that in
Kruger and Manuel,65 the source of Mr. Justice Dickson's comments on impairment of status with which this section of the paper began, the Court found
that provincial legislation which restricted Indians' hunting rights was intra
vires; that is, provincial game legislation in British Columbia applied to Indians hunting for food during the closed season on unoccupied Crown land off
the reserve. The legislation at issue, the Wildlife Act, 66 was of general application according to Dickson J.'s two indicia.67 Mr. Justice Dickson held for the
Court, saying:
However abundant the right of Indians to hunt and to fish, there can be no doubt

that such right is subject to regulation and curtailment by the appropriate
legislative authority. Section 88 of the Indian Act appears to be plain in purpose

and effect. In the absence of treaty protection or
68 statutory protection Indians are
brought within provincial regulatory legislation.

Whatever "impairment of status" means, then, it does not mean derrogation
from hunting "rights" which have traditionally been considered to be part of
Indians' identity.
B.

The ThirdPrinciple:Section 88 Limitations
If the provincial legislation is within the scope of section 92 and if it is of general
application, it will be tested against the various limitations in section 88... and it
will be declared void to the extent that it is subject to the limitations.
The third principle simply indicates that provincial legislation is subordinate
not only to the Indian Act and other federal legislation in its application to Indians and Reserves, but also to treaties and to regulations and council by-laws
61

id.

62 id.
63Supra

note 8.

1960, c. 4, s. 10, as am. by S.B.C. 1973, c. 95, s. now R.S.B.C. 1979,
c.4, 65
s. 11.
Supra note 14.
6
67 S.B.C. 1966, c. 55, now R.S.B.C. c6 4336.
See text accompanying note 16.
68
Supra note 10 at 111-12 (S.C.R.), 305 (W.W.R.), 382 (C.C.C.).
64R.S.B.C.
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made under the Indian Act. This is an additional test which provincial legislation must pass to be valid as it purports to apply to Indians, regardless of
whether it is "in relation to" Indians or Reserves. Until the passage of the
Constitution Act, 1982,69 this did not mean that treaties were "sacrosanct"
since the federal government was able to abrogate treaties at will. 70 Under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982,71 however, "existing aboriginal and
treaty rights" are "recognized and affirmed"; thus the section 88 test which
applied only to the provinces now has the status of a constitutional provision
which restricts legislation of both levels of government, federal as well as
provincial.
In addition, provincial laws can be overridden by band by-laws; for example, under section 81(o) of the Indian Act, a band council may make by-laws
with regard to "the preservation, protection and management of fur-bearing
animals, fish and other game on the reserve" and such a by-law could override
any provincial legislation which might be held applicable to a reserve and hunting thereon. The other limitations in section 88 regarding the Indian Act are
treated under the next sub-section.
C.

The Fourth Principle:ProvincialLaws andthe IndianAct
If the provincial legislation concerns a subject for which provision is made by or
under the IndianAct, it will be declared void to that extent, both by virtue of section 88 and by the paramountcy doctrine.

It is important to stress that the provincial legislation does not have to conflict
with the Indian Act in order to be declared ultra vires in regard to Indians, it
merely needs to cover the same ground. Thus, section 88 extends the paramountcy doctrine which normally applies to a conflict between federal and
72
provincial legislation, whereby the provincial law gives way to the federal.
Generally, the courts have not required the province to withdraw its legislation
if the federal government has not covered the field or if there is no inconsistency. Section 88 of the IndianAct, though, requires the provincial law to make
way for the Indian Act even if that legislation is not inconsistent with the
Act. 73 If the Indian Act makes provision for what is covered by a provincial
law, that law cannot apply to Indians. There are, therefore, two separate
standards which provincial legislation must meet: the first is the traditional
one, that it not be inconsistent with federal legislation in the area, the second is
a more demanding standard since the provincial law can have no effect if it is
concerned with anything in or under the IndianAct.
This raises the question of how narrowly or broadly the term "provision"
will be defined. In Natural Parents,74 the provincial legislation concerned
adoption; the Indian Act does refer to adoption (it says that "child" in sec69

Sched. B of the CanadaAct1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).
R. v. George [1966] S.C.R. 267, 55 D.L.R. (2d) 386, [1966] 3 C.C.C. 137;
Sikyear v. The Queen, [1964] S.C.R. 642, 50 D.L.R. (2d) 80, [1965] 2 C.C.C. 129.
71 Sched. B of the CanadaAct 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).
72 See generally, Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law (3rd rev. ed. Toronto:
Carswell,
1969) at 105 ff.
73
Hogg, ConstitutionalLawof Canada(Toronto: Carswell, 1977) at 389.
74
Supra note 4.
7

94

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL.21, NO. 1

tions 2(l) and 48(16) includes "adopted child") but it does not make reference
to adoption procedures. This seems to be too limited a reference to say that the
Indian Act makes provision for adoption. The case of R. v. Peters,75 suggests
the following standard by which to determine whether the Indian Act has
made provision for the subject matter of the provincial legislation: the Indian
Act merely has to make provision for the general subject-matter of the legisla76
tion; it is not necessary that it make provision for the specific subject-matter.
In R. v. Peters,77 the specific subject-matter of the case was consumption of
alcohol by a minor; the Indian Act did not provide specifically for consumption of alcohol by an Indian minor but it did contain provisions regarding the
use of alcohol by Indians in general. The general provision was held to include
the specific and the provincial legislation was held to be invalid against Indians.
Two recent Ontario family cases also attack the problem of the scope of
the phrase in the Indian Act "for which provision is made by or under this
Act". 78 In Sandy v. Sandy, the wife had made an application for a division of
the matrimonial home under the Family Law Reform Act, 1978. 79 Grange J.
rejected the application because the home was located on a Reserve. The lands
on which the home stood had been allotted to the husband by the Band Council with the approval of the Minister of Indian Affairs under section 20 of the
IndianAct. While the wife was entitled to an interest in the home under section
4 of the F.L.R.A.,80 Grange J. held that the division would be in relation to Indian lands upon a reserve, a federal power which only the federal government
could exercise, even if it had an incidental effect on a matter under provincial
jurisdiction (in this case, division of property between separating spouses). To
apply the F.L.R.A. 8s would disrupt the scheme devised by the federal government for holding land on a reserve. (Sandy will also be discussed infra in connection with the fifth principle which is concerned with land use).
Grange J. listed several sections of the Indian Act which deal with or
make provision for land use, yet none are in relation to the specific issue of
division of property between spouses. This is the same approach as that taken
in R. v. Peters:8 2 the Indian Act has only to speak of the general category of
the provincial legislation (for example, intoxication or property); it does not
have to provide for the specific sub-category which is the actual subject matter
of the legislation (for example, intoxication of a minor or property between
spouses). Grange J. stated that the court could not make any order without af75 (1966),

57 W.W.R. 727 (Y.T.C.A.). For a discussion of this case and the general

issue see Lysyk, The Unique ConstitutionalPosition of the CanadianIndian (1967), 45

Can. B. Rev. 513. He also refers to Re Williams Estate (1960), 32 W.W.R. 686
(B.C.S.C.) where Lord J. held that the provincial legislation in issue had only to meet
the test
of inconsistency with the IndianAct, surely a misreading of s. 88 of that Act.
76
Supranote 75, at 730.

77Id.

71Sandy v. Sandy (1979) 25 O.R. (2d), 192 (1979), 9 R.F.L. (2d) 310 (H.C.), varied
(1979), 27 O.R. (2d) 248 (C.A.), and Hopkins v. Hopkins (1980), 29 O.R. (2d) 24, 111
D.L.R.
(3d) 722, 18 R.F.L. (2d) 264 (Ont. Co. Ct.).
79
S.O. 1978, c. 2, now R.S.O. 1980, c. 152, am. by S.O. 1982, c. 20, s. 3.
80
S.O. 1978, c. 2, now R.S.O. 1980, c. 152, s. 4.
1
S.O. 1978, c. 2, now R.S.O. 1980, c. 152.
82
Supranote 75.
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fecting the husband's licence under section 20 of the IndianAct.8 3 Yet it is not
clear that this view is correct. The court could award division of the home and
order that the wife's share be satisfied by a lump sum payment; the sale of the
home could be to another Indian. This was how Mr. Justice Grange
distinguished Re Bell andBell,8 4 a case under the old PartitionAct.8 5 There the
court ordered partition and sale of the home but stated that no sale under the
PartitionAct 8 6 would be effective if it contravened the Indian Act. In other
words, the court in Re Bell and Bell 87 accommodated the rights of the applicant spouse to the requirements of the Indian Act but did not dispense with
those rights 88
because the IndianAct made provision for the sale of property on
the Reserve.
Grange J.'s decision was upheld by the Ontario Court of Appeal 89 but in
such a way that it "may have reversed the effect of the trial judgment". 9°
Jessup J.A., for the Court of Appeal, said that the learned trial judge had
gone "unnecessarily far" when he said that the F.L.R.A.91 had no validity as it
affects Indians; he went on to say that the F.L.R.A. is,
inoperative to the extent only that it affects lands occupied on a reserve by an Indian with the approval of the band and the approval of the Department of Indian
Affairs....
[W] e are of the view that an Indian such as the respondent husband in this case has
an "interest" in real property within the meaning of s. 8 of the Family Law
Reform Act, 1978 and that his spouse is therefore entitled to a payment in compensation for the matters referred to in s. 8 although she is not
92 entitled to an award of
a share of the interest of her husband in the real property.
Section 8 of the F.L.R.A. is concerned with non-family assets to which the
non-titled spouse might establish a claim. Presumably the Court of Appeal
believed that the Indian Act did not make provision for these section 8 assets.
The Court declined to list other sections of the Act which would not be in conflict with the Indian Act, but section 45, dealing exclusive possession, appears
to be one of them.
83

Sandyv. Sandy, supra note 78, at 197-98 (O.R.), 317 (R.F.L.) (H.C.).
84 (1977), 16 O.R. (2d) 197, 78 D.L.R. (3d) 227 (H.C.). Stortini Co. Ct. J. stated at
198 (O.R.), 228 (D.L.R.):
By s. 92 (13), property and civil rights in the Province are subjects concerning
which the Province has exclusive jurisdiction. The PatriationAct of Ontario
would fall under this heading. The PatriationAct cannot be said to be legislation concerning Indians. It relates to the property and civil rights of those who
share ownership of property.
Furthermore, there is no provision under the Indian Act which prevents patriation or
sale. At 201 (O.R.), 231 (D.L.R.).
1s
R.S.O. 1970, c. 338, s. 2, now R.S.O. 1980, c. 369, s. 2.
86
R.S.O. 1970, c. 338, now R.S.O. 1980, c. 3659.
7
1 Supra note 84.
11 Grange J.'s position in Sandy (supranote 78), on the other hand, would have the
effect of depriving the applicant spouse of rights which the province has clearly stated
belong to spouses. Again, this would be more detrimental to women since it is the
female spouse who is likely to be making the application.
89
90 Supra note 78.
McLeod, Annotation to Sandy v. Sandy (1980), 13 R.F.L. (2d) 81 (Ont. C.A.).
91
Family Law Reform Act, 1978 S.O. 1978, c. S.O. 1978, c. 2., now R.S.O. 1980,
c. 152, am. byS.O. 1982, c. 20, s. 3.
92
Supra note 78, at 249.
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In the subsequent case of Hopkins v. Hopkins,93 Clements Co. Ct. J.
pointed out that while certain aspects of or concepts in the F.L.R.A. conflict
with the Indian Act, section 45 of F.L.R.A., which is concerned with applications for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, does not. His Honour
posits a lower standard than does the Indian Act itself; the latter requires
merely that the provisions co-exist, not that they actually conflict. The Indian
Act does not preclude an order granting exclusive possession to another Indian, although section 24 of the IndianAct does limit transfer of possession to
another band member. If this means that the IndianAct provides for transfer
of possession, Hopkins94 must be wrongly decided, for the provincial
F.L.R.A. must give way to the Indian Act when the two make provision for
the same thing. On the basis of R. v. Peters95 and Sandy v. Sandy96 (the trial
decision not being completely overturned by the Court of Appeal), a general
provision for transfer of possession of property in the Indian Act will mean
that section 45 of the F.L.R.A. cannot apply to Indians on the Reserve; the IndianAct will not have to make specific provision for exclusive possession by a
spouse to oust the F.L.R.A.
Looking at the term "provision" in section 88 of the Indian Act in a
broad sense, Clements Co. Ct. J. stated in Hopkins97 that the Indian Act does
not deal with the "orderly and equitable settlement of affairs of the spouses"
on marriage breakdown, 98 which is the purpose of the F.L.R.A., and thus
where the provincial Act does not actually conflict with the Indian Act, the
provisions of the F.L.R.A. prevail.
In Re Baptiste; Director of Maintenance and Recovery v. Potts and Attorney GeneralofAlberta,99 the IndianAct dealt specifically with the situation
at issue while provincial legislation dealt with it more broadly. Potts had failed
to comply with an agreement he had made with the Director to provide support for his child and the Director sought to enforce the agreement. Potts contended that section 68 of the IndianAct, allowing the Minister to apply any annuity or interest monies due to a male Indian towards child support, covered
the field, leaving no room for provincial enactment on the matter. Bracco J.
found that since section 68 of the Indian Act referred only to certain
payments, the provincial Maintenance and Recovery Act'00 which took into
account all sources of revenue was not inconsistent with it.
The minister's discretion is very narrow, being confined to those funds that he may
be obliged to pay to the Indian parents. The Alberta legislation is much wider and
more comprehensive. Both can stand together. 101
The provincial legislation could not "in any way relate to the 'annuity or interest moneys payable to the Indian parents by the minister." 102
93
94

Supra note 78.
id.

95
Supra note
96

75.
Supra note 78.
97
Supra note 78.
9
Id. at 30 (O.R.), 728 (D.L.R.), 271 (F.L.R.).
99 20 A.R. 196, [1979] 6 W.W.R. 560, 12 R.F.L. (2d) 144 (Q.B.).
100
R.S.A. 1970, c. 2232, ss. 10, 21, now R.S.A. 1980, M-2, ss. 10, 21.
101Supra note 99, at 205 (A.R.), 569 (W.W.R.), 152 (R.F.L.).
' 02 d. at 205 (A.R.), 568 (W.W.R.), 152 (R.F.L.).
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The practical outcome of the decision in Re Baptiste'0 3 is that actions for
child support, or enforcing child support, would have to be brought under
both pieces of legislation in order to ensure that all sources of revenue were included. Nevertheless, this seems to be a more sensible result than to argue that
the Indian Act, because it refers to annuity and interest payments as a source
of child support, makes provision for "support for illegitimate children" in
general terms, thereby foreclosing any provincial enactment relating to the
matter of child support for native children.
It can be seen, then, that the way in which "provision" in the phrase in
section 88 of the Indian Act, "for which provision is made by or under this
Act", is interpreted (whether the Indian Act must provide specifically for the
subject-matter of the provincial legislation or whether it need only provide
generally for the subject matter) will be one factor determining whether provincial laws apply to Indians or not. Similarly, how the subject matter itself is
characterized is also significant. For example, does provision for a
matrimonial home go to spousal relations or to property? The answer will
determine whether there is any room for provincial legislation to apply when
the spouses also happen to be native persons.
D. The Fifth Principle:Land Use Characterization
If the provincial legislation can be characterized as relating to land use, it will be
void in its application to Indian Reserves by virtue of section 88 of the Indian Act.

Subsection 91(24) of the ConstitutionAct, 1982 gives jurisdiction over Indians
and lands reserved for Indians; section 88 of the Indian Act, on the other
hand, refers only to Indians and not to Indian lands. Section 88 will not invigorate provincial legislation which can be characterized as relating to lands
reserved to Indians, a power remaining within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal government. Of all the principles, this one probably has the greatest
potential for restricting the effect of provincial legislation.
It is difficult to quarrel with the characterization of some legislation as going to land use. For example, in R. v. Isaac'°4 hunting rights were characterized as rights relating to the use of land and thus provincial legislation controlling hunting rights was also characterized as in relation to land use and was
placed thereby outside the purview of section 88 of the Indian Act. In R. v.°6
Isaac,01 5 an Indian was convicted of contravening the Lands andForestsAct'
of Nova Scotia, by carrying a loaded rifle through a moose resort located on a
reserve. The relevant provision of the Lands andForestsAct'0 7 was considered
to be a hunting or game law. After a lengthy review of the cases and history,
MacKeigan C.J.N.S. found that:
Indians have a special relationship with the lands they occupy, not merely a quaint
tradition, but rather a right recognized in law. Hunting by Indians is and always
has been a use of land legally integral to the land itself. A provincial law purport-

103 Id.

104 (1975), 13 N.S.R. (2d) 460 (C.A.).
05
1d.
"6 R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 163, now Consolidated S.W.S. 1979, C-6.
07
R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 163, s. 150 [para. 5] now Consolidated S.N.S. 1979, C-6,

s. 150 [para. 5].
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ing to regulate that use on a reserve must be thereforepro tanto constitutionally ineffective. 108
In other cases, characterizing the particular provincial legislation as being
in regard to land use does seem to be stretching the terminology of "land use",
to say the least. For instance, in Millbrook Indian Band v. Northern Counties
ResidentialTenancies Board,109 Morrison J. characterized the landlord-tenant
relationship as one based on real property or land use: "The Residential
Tenancies Act basically is legislation dealing with
the management, use and
110
control of land by both landlords and tenants."
The learned trial judge rejected the argument advanced by the Board that
the Act's real subject matter was the relationship between landlord and tenant
which arose out of a particular use of land. This holding is similar to that of
Grange J.'s in Sandy v. Sandy'1 1 where he rejected the plaintiff's (Mrs. Sandy)
submission that "the [F.L.R.A.] is not in relation to Indians and Indian land
but to husbands and wives and applies only incidentally to Indians when they
have adopted the matrimonial state." 112 Having characterized the legislation
in each case as relating to land use, both the trial judges have sealed the fate of
the legislation.
Thus the Residential Tenancies Act,"13 which controls landlord-tenant
relations in Nova Scotia, does not apply to Indian landlord-tenant relationships on Indian land. In the case, the landlord was an Indian owned trailer
park and the tenant a white woman. The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal,
although upholding the decision, did so on the ground that the tenant in question had not obtained the required permit and thus her occupancy of the
mobile home park lot was unlawful. 114 Unfortunately, as a result, it did not
consider it necessary to decide the constitutional issue.
The land use argument has been made with regard to traffic regulation, as
well. In R. v. Johns"s , Johns had committed a breach of section 6 of the Indian Reserve Traffic Regulations made pursuant to (then) section 72 of the Indian Act when he drove without a licence, contrary to the Saskatchewan
Vehicles Act. 116 The important point is that Johns was not in breach of the
provincial traffic legislation but of regulations made under the Indian Act.
Woods J.A. explained that the provincial legislation was incorporated into the
Indian Act Regulations; 117 section 6 of the Indian Act did not make drivers
0

' Supra note 104 at 485. See also Sikyea v. The Queen, supra note 28. The
Supreme Court of Canada did not take the land use approach in Kruger and Manuel,
supra note 14. As an alternate basis for the decision, the Court in Isaac found that hunting rights had been confirmed in Nova Scotia by The Royal Proclamation, 1763 (Imp.),
R.S.C. 1970, Appendix II, No. 1.
'09(1978) 84 D.L.R. (3d) 174, (1978), 3 R.R.R. 199 (N.S.S.C.), aff'd (1978), 95
D.L.R. (3d), 43 A.P.R. 268,28 N.S.R. (2d) 268 (C.A.).
"0 1d, at 181 (D.L.R.), 208 (R.P.R.) (S.C.).
..
Supra note 78.
n21d. at 197 (O.R.), 317 (R.F.L.) (H.C.).
13 S.N.S. 1970, c. 13.
114 Supra note 78.
1t
"Supra note 7.
116
S.S. 1957, c. 43, now R.S.B. 1978, c. V-3.
7
" IndianReserve Traffic Regulations,S.O.R. 54-1314, s. 6.
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liable under the provincial legislation but merely used the provincial Act's contents to establish what would constitute a breach of the Traffic Regulations.
Johns was not charged as an Indian; the important factor was that the breach
occurred on "lands reserved for the Indians" since the highway on which
Johns was driving was on a reserve. "Lands reserved for the Indians" were
totally within the competence of the federal government and since traffic
regulations were in relation to such lands, the regulations also were within the
competence of the federal government.
Municipal and provincial health standards legislation has also been held
to be in relation to land use. The British Columbia Court of Appeal in Corporation of Surrey v. Peace Arch EnterprisesLtd. 118 found that reserve land
which had been leased to white persons was still considered reserve land. The
lessees were planning to build a restaurant and amusement park which would
normally be subject to municipal and provincial health standards legislation.
The Court of Appeal held that the legislation was in relation to land use on Indian reserves; thus it was not applicable to reserves.
Peace Arch n 9 seems to be an abuse of the land use characterization.
Health legislation is in pith and substance in relation to the protection of people's health and safety, not in relation to land use; the fact that such legislation
might apply to enterprises on a reserve is merely an incidental effect of valid
provincial legislation. The Court did not base its decision on impairment of
status or on conflict with, or co-existent provisions in, the Indian Act. There is
no apparent advantage to removing reserves from the impact of such legislation while there is the disadvantage of no substitute legislation: surely people
entering this restaurant and amusement park are entitled to do so in the confidence that their health is being protected in the same way it is in restaurants
and parks in other areas of the province.
To put the land use characterization in perspective, it might be useful to
analyse Four B Manufacturing20° using that approach. While the case clearly
seems to be about labour relations (both the majority and minority agree
about that; they merely disagree about whether the federal or provincial act
should apply), it could be characterized as in relation to land use. The minority
comes close to that by emphasizing the section 18 requirement of a permit.
One wonders whether there really is any difference between Four B121 and
Millbrook Indian Band v. Residential Tenancies Board.122 In the latter case,
the landlord-tenant legislation was characterized as going to land use since the
legislation, according to the court, set out how land was to be used and managed. But it is surely more accurate to characterize landlord-tenant legislation as
concerned with the regulation of relations between two classes of people,
18(1970),

74 W.W.R. 380 (B.C.C.A.).

190 Id.

2 Supra note 39.
121 id.

122Supra note 109. There are similarities between Four B Manufacturing and
Millbrook: both involve Indian owners (of a company in Four B and of a trailer park in
Millbrook); both groups required permits to operate on an Indian reserve; both involved non-Indians (as employees in Four B and as a tenant in Millbrook); and there is
nothing particularly "Indian" about either a factory making uppers for shoes or a
trailer park.
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landlords and tenants; it establishes the obligations and rights existing between
those two classes. Those obligations and rights involve property, but they go
beyond it.
It also has to be recognized that this property is not land as such and that
landlord-tenant legislation also provides redress for problems arising out of
the "personal" relationship between the two groups. In addition, such legislation provides for the relations among tenants (they are not to disturb each
other, for example).
Similarly, the purpose of the Family Law Reform Act 123 is to regulate
relations between separating or divorcing spouses, establishing the rights and
obligations between them. It does involve property to a great degree but goes
beyond it to consider, for example, custody and support. The same can be said
of labour relations legislation. It seems to have as its purpose the regulation of
relations between employers and employees; but it, too, involves property:
what is to happen or not happen in or in relation to, for example, a factory
(just as landlord-tenant legislation sets out what is to happen or not happen in
or in relation to, say, an apartment building). The question to be answered is
whether renting an apartment or working in a factory constitutes an integral
aspect of the use of the land on which the premises are situate, just as hunting
has been found to be an integral aspect of the use of the land. 124 Once it
becomes possible to characterize landlord-tenant and labour legislation in relation to the use of land, section 88 cannot give the provincial legislation force; it
refers only to Indians, not to Indian lands which by virtue of section 91(24)
come exclusively within federal jurisdiction. This revives, it is submitted, the
early distinction in the case between the application of provincial legislation to
Indians on reserves and off reserves.
In the pre-1951 cases (section 87, the predecessor to section 88, was introduced to the Indian Act in 1951),125 the courts appear to have had some difficulty in applying provincial legislation to Indians on reserves. In a 1944 case,
R. v. Groslouis,126 involving the Quebec Retail Sales Tax Act, 127 Pettigrew J.
Sess. commented that:
It seems to follow from jurisprudence taken as a whole that the Indian, in so far as
an Indian inhabiting a Reserve under the control of the Dominion Government, is
not amenable to the laws of the Provinces; but as soon as he goes out of that
Reserve, he becomes, like any ordinary citizen, subject to the application of pro-

vincial laws to which he128owes obedience failing which he is liable to the penalties
provided in such a case.

But he also warned that the Reserve does not form "a small independent country, enclaved in the Province, subject to the sole directions of the Councils and
the Chief of the band." 1 29 This does not mean that provincial laws apply to the
Reserve, of course, but that federal laws do. Finally, he hints at the general
123 R.S.O. 1980, c. 152, as am. by S.O. 1982, c. 20, s. 3.
12A
SeeR. v. Isaac, supra note 104.
'2 S.C. 1951, c. 29.
126 [1944] R.L. 12, 18 C.C.C. 167.
127 R.S.Q. 1941, c. 88, now R.S.Q. 1977, c. I-.
128
Supra note 126, at 15 (R.L.), 171 (C.C.C.).
129 1d. at 17 (R.L.), 173 (C.C.C.).
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theme of section 87 still to be examined: while the Indian lives on the Reserve,
he is subject to the Indian Act but "[wihen the Act respecting the Indian is
silent, the problem
must be solved in the light of the general law, either federal
30
or provincial." 1
The learned judge seized on the particular facts of the Groslouis131 case to
treat it as one in which the act in issue took place off the reserve. Groslouis had
sold goods to a white man without collecting sales tax; although Groslouis was
physically on the reserve, His Honour held that in selling goods to a nonIndian, Groslouis had engaged in "an action which causes him, theoretically,
to go outside the Reserve,"' 132 thus making him liable for not collecting sales
tax. 133 It was, it should be mentioned, no small part of Pettigrew J.'s Sess.
concern that to hold otherwise would condone the white man's evasion of sales
tax by purchasing goods on a Reserve.
The majority and minority in R. v. Rodgers,134 another pre-1951 case,
clearly outline "the on/off reserve dichotomy" (to use Lysyk's phrase 35).
Rodgers was a white man who had, in breach of the Manitoba Game Protec-.
tion Act, 136 failed to obtain the permit number of the trapper from whom he
had bought a mink pelt; as an Indian, the trapper was exempt from the requirement of obtaining a permit to trap. The pelt was purchased off the
reserve but caught on the reserve. The Game Protection Act 137 by its provisions did not apply to Indians on reserves in regard to hunting animals and
birds used for food, but it did not exempt Indians from the sale or trafficking
provisions.
The majority were of the view that "no statutory provision or regulation
made by the Province in regard to the hunting of game or fur-bearing animals
138
on an Indian reserve would apply to treaty Indians residing on the reserve."
The Indian trapper had the right to catch mink on his reserve and, therefore,
he also had a right to deal with it as his own property. This seems to contravene the purpose of the legislation which was to allow the Indians to hunt
for food unencumbered by licencing requirements but
not to allow them to
39
engage in commercial practices with regard to game. 1
130 Id. at 18 (R.L.), 173 (C.C.C.).
131Id.
132 1d.

133 The facts inCardinal,supra note 8, are not dissimilar to those in Groslow's in

the sense that Cardinal sold moose meat to a white man on a Reserve, in breach of the
provincial Wildlife Act R.S.A. 1970, c. 391, s. 37, now R.S.A. 1980, c. W-9, s. 42. The
majority of the Supreme Court supplied the provincial Act to the Reserve and were able

to uphold Cardinal's conviction under the Act without manipulating the facts to bring

Cardinal "theoretically" off the Reserve (the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal's reversal of Cardinal's acquital at trial).
134
[1923] 3 D.L.R. 414, 33 Man. R. 139, 40 C.C.C. 51 (C.A.).
5
13
Supra note 75, at 541.
36
1 S.M. 1916, c. 44.
131
S.M. 1916, c. 44.

131R. v. Rodgers,supra note 134, at 415 (D.L.R.), 141 (M.R.), 53 (C.C.C.).
139 Cf. Cardinalv.

A.G. Alta., supra note 8. Cardinal was protected by the Natural
Resource Agreement between Alberta and the federal government as far as hunting for
food in all seasons was concerned, but he was not exempt from provincial trafficking
regulations.
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In his dissent, Dennistoun J.A. found that since the sale took place off the
reserve, the Indian was "subject to the general laws of the Province in respect
to property and civil rights."'

140

But it is likely that he would have come to the

same conclusion even if the sale had taken place on the reserve, for he states
that "[i]n the absence of express legislation to the contrary by the Dominion/
[and there was not any such legislation here], an Indian whether
141 on or off his
reserve is, I think, subject to the general law of the Province."
From the post-1951 perspective, Professor Hogg takes the same position
as Dennistoun J.A. He states that "[tlhe better view of the law is that there is
no constitutional distinction between 'Indians' and 'lands reserved for the Indians', and that provincial laws may apply to both subject matters." 142 In light
143
of some of the cases already examined (particularly the traffic case, Johns,
and the health legislation case, Peace Arch'44), it is worth continuing this apparent digression from the discussion of the land use principle to quote rather
extensively from Hogg:
It would be astonishing if the provinces lacked the constitutional power to make
applicable to Indians and on reserves laws such as that making drivers drive on the
right-hand side of the road, or confining the practice of medicine to qualified
physicians, or imposing standards of construction for residential housing. The
situation of the Indians and of Indian reserves should not be any different from
that of aliens, banks, federally incorporated companies, and interprovincial
undertakings. These, too, are subjects of federal legislative power, but they still
have to pay provincial taxes, and obey provincial traffic laws, health and safety requirements .... and the myriad of other provincial laws which 5apply to them in
common with other similarly-situated residents of the province.14
On the face of it, this seems to be a sensible position for one to take; but it is
not necessarily the one taken by the courts. R. v. Johns146 raises the possibility

of different traffic legislation on and off the reserve (after all, the federal
Regulations do not have to incorporate the provincial traffic legislation,
although they do). And the Peace Arch147 case held that provincial health requirements were not applicable on the reserve, "astonishing" as that may be
140Supra
note 134, at 419 (D.L.R.), 144 (M.R.), 59 (C.C.C.).
141 1d. at 421 (D.L.R.), 146 (M.R.), 59 (C.C.C.).
42
1 Supra note 20.
143 Supra note 7.
144Supra note 118.

5
14
Supra note 20, at 387. See also Lysyk, supra note 75, at 540, where Lysyk rejects

the view that the applicability of provincial laws depends on "whether or not the Indian
is on a reserve at the material time, or whether the activity sought to be regulated is being engaged upon by an Indian on a reserve." Arguably, Peace Arch, supra note 118,
takes the last point one step further in that "the activity sought to be regulated" was being engaged in by white people on a reserve. See Lysyk, supra note 75, at 540, where he
suggests that the implications of Rodgers, supra note 134, is that a ban on provincial
legislation on the reserve would encompass non-Indians as well as Indians.
Although at 541, on the authority of R. v. McLeod, [1830] 2 W.W.R. 37, 54
C.C.C. 107 (B.C. Co. Ct.) and R. v. Morkey, [1932] 4 D.L.R. 483, 46 B.C.R. 28, 58
C.C.C. 166 (C.A.), he qualifies the territorial theory in respect of applicability of provincial laws to non-Indians on reserves. In these two cases, the courts rejected the idea
that a ban on provincial legislation on the reserve would encompass non-Indians as well
as Indians.
146
Supra note 7.
147Supra note 118.
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to Professor Hogg. In addition, section 81(h) of the IndianAct allows a Band
Council to make by-laws about "the construction, repair and use of buildings" owned by the Band or individual members of the Band; such a by-law
would, by section 88 of the IndianAct, override provincial legislation "imposing standards of construction for residential housing".
Despite the wording of section 88 (which fails to make a distinction between Indians on reserves and Indians off reserves) and the commonsense of
the position articulated by Professor Hogg (that there is no reason not to apply, for example, health standards to a reserve and every reason to expect that
they would be applied, because they have nothing to do with Indians qua Indians), the land use characterization puts us very neatly back in the lap of
Groulouis148 and R. v. Rodgers.1 49 Using their characterization, there is a difference in the way provincial laws are applied to Indians on and off reserves.
Under the rubric of "lands reserved for the Indians", the land use
characterization allows an intrusion by the federal government into areas
which normally would not be within its jurisdiction and which are very clearly
within the provincial government's competence. In other words, this approach
would allow the federal government to legislate for "lands reserved for the Indians" whether or not the particular legislation were "in relation to" such
lands (as opposed to any other lands). This constitutes an unjustified incursion
into the provincial power of property and civil rights.
In any case, provincial legislation faces a bleak future as an independent
entity should the referential incorporation argument, discussed in the next section, be successful.
E.

The Sixth Principle:Independence or Subordination?
If the provincial legislation escapes the net of the foregoing tests, it will be applied
as federal if section 88 does in fact referentially incorporate provincial legislation.

The Supreme Court of Canada considered this question in the Natural
Parents150 case. Unfortunately, the outcome was less than decisive: four
members of the Court held that section 88 of the Indian Act referentially incorporated the Adoption Act 151 of British Columbia and four held that section
88 is a statement of the extent to which provincial laws apply to Indians. Mr.
Justice Beetz did not rule on this point.
It would seem, however, that even the "referential incorporationists"
would not apply their theory to all provincial legislation. Chief Justice Laskin,
speaking for Judson, Spence and Dickson JJ., made a distinction between
legislation such as traffic regulations which can, presumably, apply of their
own force and legislation such as adoption legislation which cannot apply of
its own force. The difference between the two types of legislation is that the
latter involves "Indianness". In R. v. Isaac,152 Chief Justice MacKeigan inter53
preted the position of the "Laskin faction" in NaturalParents:1
148Supra note 128.
19
Supra note 118.
150Supra note 4.
151 R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 4., now R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 4.
112 Supra note 104.
53
Supra note 4.
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[They] found that the Adoption Act encroached on a federal legislative area in affecting the status of the adopted child as an Indian
butIndians,
that thetoAct
preserved
ve4
Indians.
all was
by section 88, which applied it, as legislation affecting
It is difficult to accept this interpretation. MacKeigan C.J. says that
Laskin C.J. and Judson, Spense and Dickson JJ. found that the Adoption
Act 155 affected Indian status but was saved by referential incorporation under
section 88. It is hard to understand why the Adoption Act 15 6 would affect
status as provincial legislation but not do so as federal legislation, which is the
implication of MacKeigan C.J.'s view. The better position is that a referentially
incorporated Adoption Act 5 7 would continue to affect status (if it did so as
provincial legislation) but would do so validly since the federal government,
unlike the provincial legislation, has the power to affect status. Yet Chief
Justice Laskin states explicitly that the Adoption Act 158 does not actually affect the child's legal status as an Indian. 159
The better view of the Laskin position seems to be this: the child's legal
Indian status derives from section II(1)(d) of the Indian Act and depends on
whether his father was registered as an Indian under the IndianAct; the child's
entitlement to registration is not destroyed by the cessation of the child's relationship with his natural parents "for all purposes" for which the Adoption
Act' 6° provides in section 10(2). Rather, adoption of Indian children by nonIndians does interfere with the cultural upbringing of the child as an Indian
and does separate the child from the locus of his heritage, even though it does
not affect his legal status as an Indian under the Indian Act. There is, then, a
risk of impairment to status in this broad cultural sense. A provincial statute
cannot have that effect; a federal statute, which the Adoption Act 1 61 becomes
through incorporation, can.
Mr. Justice Martland, speaking for Pigeon and de Grandpr6 JJ. on section 88 of the Indian Act, held that provincial legislation applies of its own
force as long as it passes muster under section 88.162 Mr. Justice Ritchie, in a
separate opinion, took the same view. 1 63 The Adoption Act,164 said Martland

'54Supra note 104, at 472. It is assumed here that the Chief Justice means legal
status under s. 11 of the IndianAct.
55
' R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 4., now R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 4.
156 R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 4., now R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 4.
157 R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 4, now R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 4.
158R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 4., now R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 4.
59
Supra note 4, at 765 (S.C.R.), 158 (D.L.R.), 709 (W.W.R.).
'60 R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 4., s. 10(2) reads:
For all purposes an adopted child ceases upon adoption to be the child of his existing parents (whether his natural parents or his adopting parents under a
previous adoption), and the existing parents of the adopted child cease to be his
parents.
Now R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 4., s. 11(2).
161R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 4.
162Supra note 4, at 775 (S.C.R.), 165 (D.L.R.), 717 (W.W.R.).
161 Id. at 781 (S.C.R.), 170 (D.L.R.), 716 (W.W.R.).
'64 R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 4., now R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 4.
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J., does not restrict the rights of Indians (as does, for example, provincial
minimum wage legislation restrict enterprises within exclusive federal jurisdiction). He found that when the Adoption Act 165 speaks of the child's relationship with the natural parents ceasing "for all purposes", it can include only
those purposes within the competence of the British Columbia legislature; that
does not, of course, include Indian status.
For the Chief Justice, the onus is on those who believe provincial legislation should apply to Indians to show that the legislation does not touch on
"Indianness". He states that provincial legislation should not apply to Indians
"unless the inclusion of Indians within the scope of the provincial legislation
touches them as ordinary persons and in a way that does not intrude on their
Indian character or their Indian identity and relationship."1 66 His lordship further states that:
When section 88 refers to 'all laws of general application from time to time in force
in any province', it cannot be assumed to have legislated a nullity but, rather, to
have in mind provincial legislation which, per se, would
167not apply to Indians under
the Indian Act unless given force by federal reference.
To argue that section 88 is declaratory other than in relation to the opening
provisions is to say that "it is wholly declaratory save perhaps in its reference
to 'the terms of any treaty', a strange reason, in my view, to explain all the
other provisions of section 88."168 His lordship points to the concluding words
of section 88 which "indicate clearly that Parliament is indeed effecting incorporation by reference." 169 For the Chief Justice the power of the federal
government under section 91(24) is extensive so that provincial legislation
which affects Indians or applies on a Reserve can readily be characterized as
"inrelation to" Indians or lands reserved for Indians. To allow the provincial
legislation to apply of its own force would be "to treat the distribution of
legislative powers as being a distribution of concurrent powers." 170 Referential
incorporation is the way in which to avoid a concurrent powers situation and
save the provincial legislation at the same time: the substance of the legislation
applies, but through the federal instead of a provincial mechanism.
The words that the Chief Justice looks to in section 88 as evidence of his
position that the section referentially incorporates provincial legislation are
"except to the extent that such laws make provision for anything for which
provision is made by or under" the IndianAct. It is not clear why these words
do in fact show that section 88 is meant to incorporate provincial legislation.
After all, if provision were made by or under the Indian Act for the subject
matter of a piece of provincial legislation, it would be redundant to then apply
that provincial legislation as incorporated into federal law. It is clear from
Natural Parents, at least, that the Chief Justice does not find the alternative

165
R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 4., now R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 4.
166
Supra note 4, at 763 (S.C.R.), 156 (D.L.R.), 706 (W.W.R.).

167 Id.

161Id. at 763 (S.C.R.), 156 (D.L.R.), 707 (W.W.R.).

169
Id.
171
Id. at 764 (S.C.R.), 156 (D.L.R.), 707 (W.W.R.).
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view 171 palatable: he has no desire in that case, for example,
to deprive Indian
72
children of the opportunity of adoption by non-Indians. 1
The Chief Justice's approach seems to be directed more towards expanding the federal government's already extensive jurisdiction under section
91(24) rather than towards protecting Indian rights. It is difficult to see why
provincial legislation within the usual areas of provincial competence would
pose more of a threat than the federal government's capacity to derogate from
Indian rights. Surely a sufficient buffer is placed between the Indians and provincial legislation that they need not feel abnormally endangered by it - even
structurally, in its phrasing, provincial legislation lies as an island in a sea of
qualifications.
Professor Hogg suggests that the legislation will apply, either as provincial or as federal law; what really matters is our view of reserves:
For those who assert a substantial degree of immunity from provincial laws for Indians or Indian reserves, section 88 operates as a federal adoption, or incorporation by reference, of provincial laws, making the provincial laws applicable as part
of federal law. For those who assert that provincial laws of general application will
apply to Indians and on reserves of their own force, section 88 is mainly declaratory of existing law. 173

Probably it is true to say that our perception of the characterization process as
described in the foregoing pages will be in large part influenced by the
philosophical framework we bring to the issue of Indians and Indian reserves.
This point will be discussed after a brief analysis of a final test to which provincial legislation and federal legislation will be subject, that of compliance
with the ConstitutionAct, 1982.174
F. PrincipleSeven: The Challenge of the "New" Constitution
Even if a provincial law escapes the net of all the preceding tests, it must also pass
the challenge posed by the ConstitutionAct, 1981.
Before plunging further into the murky waters of the "new" Constitution, it must be pointed out that this test or principle differs from the other six
in that it applies equally to federal legislation. Nevertheless, since provincial
legislation must conform, it seems appropriate to treat it as a final barrier to
the applicability of provincial legislation to Indians and reserves. Bearing in
mind that point and the speculative nature of any discussion regarding the
Constitution Act, 1982175 at this time, this section will deal briefly with two
relevant sections of that Act:
s.25. The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and freedoms shall not be construed so as to abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights or
freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal peoples of Canada including:
171
The alternate view is that if the provincial legislation does make provision for
anything provided for under the Indian Act, the provincial legislation will be void to
that extent.
172 Supra note 4, at 766 (S.C.R.), 158 (D.L.R.), 709 (W.W.R.).
3
17
Supranote 20, at 388. See also Lysyk, supra note 30, at 538.
74
1 Sched. B of the CanadaAct 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).
175 Sched. B of the CanadaAct 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).
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(a) any rights or freedoms that have been recognized by the Royal Proclamation

of October 7, 1763; and

(b) any rights or freedoms that may be acquired by the aboriginal peoples of

Canada by way of land claims settlement.

s.35. (1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of

Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.

(2) In this Act, 'aboriginal peoples of Canada' includes the Indian, Inuit and
M6tis peoples of Canada.

The first point to note about these sections is their respective placements
in the Constitution Act, 1982.176 Section 25 is placed within the Canadian
Charterof Rights and Freedoms;177 it is not vulnerable to the provincial over-

ride under literal interpretation of section 33 since only sections 2 and 7 to 15
are included in section 33; however, insofar as native persons cannot be treated
differently than other persons on the basis of their status as native persons,
they enjoy the protection of section 15, the "equality provision", which is subject to the provincial override. It must be sufficient merely to mention in the
context of this paper that the entire Indian Act may offend against section 15
when that section comes into force in 1985.178
Section 25, as part of the Charter, is apparently subject to section 1 which
subjects the rights set out in the Charterto "such reasonable limits prescribed
by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." The
wording of section 25, however, might well be considered an "interpretation"
section rather than a section which guarantees or sets out substantive rights.
All the section really says is that other rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
Charter shall not be interpreted so as to diminish treaty or other rights involving aboriginal peoples. It seems that section 25 operates only in the context of
a conflict between an aboriginal right and some other right; in other words, it
does not make a statement about aboriginal rights in themselves but only addresses a situation involving conflict with other rights.
The positive guarantee of aboriginal rights appears in section 35 which
constitutes a Part of the Constitution independent of the Charter. Presumably
this section is therefore free from either the section 1 or section 33 qualification.
A second point to be noted is the reference to time in each section. Among
the section 25 rights (but not constituting the totality of the section 25 rights)
are rights which have been recognized in the past by the Royal Proclamation,
1763179 and rights which might be recognized in the future, as long as they are
"acquired" in relation to land claims or through land claims settlement, but
not necessarily in relation to land claims (both interpretations appear possible
on the basis of the wording of section 25(b) ). Section 25 refers to aboriginal
and treaty rights but it also refers to "other rights or freedoms"; section 35
refers only to treaty and aboriginal rights.
176 Sched. B of the CanadaAct 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).
17' Part I (SS. 1-34) of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, Sched. B of the CanadaAct 1982,

1982, 78
c. 11 (U.K.).
1 Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, Sched. B of the CanadaAct 1982, 1982,
c. 11 (U.K.).
171 (Imp.), R.S.C. 1970, Appendix II, No. 1.
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The only rights guaranteed in section 35 are "existing" rights; does this
mean that rights which are acquired in the future, through land claims settlement, for example, will have no independent guarantee and yet cannot be
derogated from, should a conflict arise between such a right and some other
right? The measure of "existing" is not specified: are these only judicially
recognized rights or is there some other reference point? Section 37(2) of the
ConstitutionAct, 1982180 provides a mechanism, or at least a tentative beginning, by which to answer such questions: it provides for a constitutional conference to be held within a year after Part IV comes into force at which shall be
considered, inter alia, the definition of aboriginal rights. This conference was
held during the week of March 14th, 1983, without any resolution of these difficulties being achieved. If anything, the conference emphasized the intensity
experienced in regard to ambiguous terms such as "aboriginal rights" and
"title".
Even this brief deviation has indicated the difficulties inherent in assessing
the impact of the Constitution Act, 1982181 on the applicability of provincial
legislation to Indians and reserves. If hunting, fishing and trapping rights are
included in the definition of "existing" rights, for example, there can be no
provincial incursion on them. It would no longer be possible to subject an action of a native person to provincial legislation and find that the action
breaches the legislation; the legislation would have to be changed to conform
to the right recognized by section 35. Again, however, it is not yet known how
rights are to be defined; "existing" rights might be held to find their reference
point in legislation, in judicial decisions or in some quite autonomous list of
rights established at the constitutional conference.
One specific illustration should suffice to show the complex nature of the
constitutional provisions relating to aboriginal rights. In Kruger and
Manuel,182 the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed appeals from the decision
of the British Columbia Court of Appeal which had been based in part on the
effect of the Royal Proclamation,1763.183 Since the Proclamation was neither
a treaty nor an act of the Parliament of Canada, it could not serve to restrict,
through the operation of section 88, the effect of the WildlifeAct 184 on Indians
hunting for food. While the Proclamation is specifically referred to in section
25 of the Constitution Act, 1982185 it is not referred to in section 35. It may
develop that rights deriving from the Proclamation are found to be "existing"
rights at the constitutional conference; in that case, a Kruger and Manuel 86
situation would have to be decided in the opposite way to that in which it was
in fact decided by the Supreme Court. On the other hand, if the effect of the
Proclamation is restricted to section 25 of the ConstitutionAct, 1982187Kruger
and Manuel'88 would stand as good law, unless one could find another right
180 Sched.
181 Sched.
82

1

B of the CanadaAct1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).
B of the CanadaAct1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).

Supra note 14.

(Imp.), R.S.C. 1970, Appendix II, No. 1.
S.B.C. 1966, c. 55, now R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 433.
185 Sched. B of the CanadaAct 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).
183

184

Supranote 14.
187 Sched. B of the CanadaAct 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).
186

8

I Supra note 14.
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guaranteed by the Charter against which to oppose hunting rights deriving
from the Proclamation.
At this point any prediction as to the effect of the ConstitutionalAct,
1982189 is so highly conjectural that it either requires an article of its own or is
hardly worth mentioning. To heed this admonition suggests ceasing this
already prolonged discussion. What can be said, however, is that federal
powers are more likley to suffer curtailment under the Act than are already
restricted provincial powers in this area; section 88, as part of the Indian Act,
might fall victim to the equality provision of the Charter, thus releasing provincial legislation from the manacles of prior judicial prounouncements and
re-opening the entire question for analysis.
III. THE ENCLAVE THEORY
Although section 88 was not dealt with by the majority in Cardinalv.
A.G. of Alberta,190 the case serves to present clearly the two predominant
views of reserves.
Cardinal was a treaty Indian who had sold a piece of moose meat on the
Reserve to a non-Indian; he was charged with unlawful trafficking in big game
contrary to the Wildlife Act 191 of Alberta. Section 12 of the Natural Resource
Agreement entered into by Alberta and the federal government (given force of
law by incorporation into the ConstitutionAct, 1930)192 guaranteed to the Indians their right to hunt, fish and trap for food at all seasons, but provided
that otherwise Indians were subject to provincial laws in relation to hunting.
Since trafficking is not a right exempted from the operation of section 12 (or,
to put it another way, is not 193
a right protected by section
12), the trafficking
194
provisions of the Wildlife Act applied to Cardinal.
For the purposes of this article, the important aspect of Cardinal'95 is the
enclave theory enunciated by Mr. Justice Laskin, as he then was. The essence
of the enclave theory is that the exclusive power in Parliament to regulate activities on Indian Reserves "puts such tracts of land, albeit they are physically
in a Province, beyond provincial competence to regulate their use or to control
resources thereon." 196 Laskin J., Hall and Spence JJ. concurring, classifies the
reserve as an entity far more significant than a piece of land:
Indian Reserves are enclaves which, so long as they exist as Reserves, are with-

drawn from provincial regulatory power.

0 0 0

[A Reserve] is a social and economic community unit, with its own political structure as well according to the prescriptions of the Indian Act ... and is no more

subject to provincial legislation than is federal Crown property; and it is no more
189 Sched.

B of the CanadaAct1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).
'90Supra note 8.
191S.B.C. 1966, c. 55, now R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 433.
192 ConstitutionAct, 1930, 20 & 21 Geo. 5, c. 26.
193 S.B.C. 1966, c. 55, s. 4 (1)(c), now R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 433, s. 3(1)(c).
194 Supra note 8, at 710 (S.C.R.), 564 (D.L.R.) 11-12 (C.C.C.) per Martland J. and
at 720 (S.C.R.), 571 (D.L.R.), 19 (C.C.C.) per Laskin J. (as he then was).
195 Id.
196 Id. at 715 (S.C.R.), 568 (D.L.R.), 15 (C.C.C.).
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subject to provincial regulatoriauthority than is any other enterprise falling within
exclusive federal competence. 7
The majority of the Court explicitly rejected this doctrine, holding that
reserves are not enclaves. The test of applying provincial legislation to reserves
is the same as that determining the applicability of provincial legislation under
any circumstances:
[I]t must be within the authority of section 92 and must not be in relation to a subject matter assigned exclusively to the Canadian Parliament under section 91. Two
of those subjects are Indians and Indian Reserves, but if Provincial legislation
within the limits of section 92 is not construed as being legislation in relation to
those classes of subjects ... it is applicable anywhere in the Province, including Indian Reserves, even though Indians or Indian Reserves might be affected by it. 98
The principles of constitutional interpretation provide no justification for
treating the section 91(24) power any differently than any other section 91
power nor any reason for placing a greater onus on the application of provincial laws because they happen to apply to Indians or reserves than when they
apply to any other easily identifiable group in the province. Where the federal
government intends to place the Indians in a different legal position than other
peoples with respect to the application of provincial legislation, it can be provided for specifically, as is done in the case of education by sections 114-123 of
the IndianAct.
The enclave theory does not postulate that Indians are to govern
themselves, although the Indian Act does permit some self-government along
the lines of a municipality (with the difference that provincial laws will be
subservient to by-laws passed by a Band council), the theory does, however,
give to the federal government a scope of legislative and administrative power
it does not enjoy in other areas.
Beyond the legal basis for the enclave doctrine (that is, the scope awarded
section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867) 199, there is a politically-based
perception that native peoples are a distinct social and political entity and
should, therefore, be accorded distinct treatment. There is an implicit assumption that provincial laws will somehow disturb that distinctiveness if they apply
to Indians or Reserves and that Indian rights are best protected if they are left
almost solely to the federal government's jurisdiction. It is suggested that the
enclave theorists have allowed constitutional interpretation principles to take
second place to their view of the uniqueness of Indian reserves.
IV. CONCLUSION
This analysis of the application of provincial legislation to Indians and
Reserves has shown that there is considerable potential in the characterization
197 Id. at 716-17 (S.C.R.), 569 (D.L.R.), 16 (C.C.C.). The implications of the

enclave theory for other federal undertakings is explored in Gibson, The Federal
Enclave Fallacy in Canadian ConstitutionalLaw (1976), 14 Alta. L. Rev. 167. Gibson
argues that the theory can be read down to apply only when proprietary rights are involved. Since then, NaturalParents, supra note 4, has shown that the dissent in Cardinal,198supra note 8, did not have such a limited approach in mind.
Id. at 703 (S.C.R.), 560 (D.L.R.), 7 (C.C.C.).
19930-31 Vict., c. 3 as am. by item I of Sched. to the ConstitutionAct, 1982, Sched.
B of the CanadaAct 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).
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principles for the almost complete elimination of a provincial presence from
those areas; this is particularly so in relation to Reserves. It is true that on four
occasions, the Supreme Court of Canada has held that provincial legislation in
three different areas - game laws, adoption and labour relations - have applied of their own force to Indians and Reserves. It must also be acknowledgsame cases has been determined
ed, however, that the dissent in three of those
2 °°
and has spoken with great persuasiveness.
Of the seven characterization principles discussed in this article, perhaps
that involving the "land use doctrine" poses the greatest threat to a provincial
presence on the Reserve. Admittedly, that doctrine has not yet been accepted
20
by the Supreme Court of Canada; nevertheless, a case such as Peace Arch
provides illustration of how far the doctrine can be extended. It should also be
noted that PeaceArch 20 2 was referred to uncritically by Mr. Justice Martland
in Cardinal.20 3 The discussion of the closing words of section 88 of the Indian
Act - provincial legislation is void to the extent it makes provision for
anything for which provision is made by or under the Indian Act - has shown
that they, too, can be a powerful instrument in the derogation from provincial
autonomy 2° 4 depending on how broadly the courts draw the term "provision".
Taken together, the characterization principles constitute a potentially severe
assault on provincial jursidiction when it crosses the boundaries of the Indian
Reserve.
It is tempting to argue that the well-being or independence of native
peoples should be the criterion determining whether any particular legislation,
provincial or federal, be applied. Ideally, it would be desirable to assess all
legislation, whether affecting Indians or not, by criteria which show concern
for and sensitivity to the groups involved. Given a different system, that might
be possible. Canada is, however, a system with political - and in this context,
particularly constitutional - restraints which cannot be ignored. The treatment of provincial legislation by the minority of the Supreme Court in Cardinal,20 5 Four B Manufacturing 2 6 and Natural Parents20 7 and by the Nova
Scotia Court of Appeal in Millbrook Indian Band2°8 (by its failure to approach
the constitutional questions) and the British Columbia Court of Appeal in
Peace Arch20 9 threatens to the ever tenuous balance between the interplay of
provincial and federal legislative autonomy within the jurisdictions allotted to
those governments under sections 91 and 92 of the ConstitutionAct, 1867.210
2
00 The Court
201

in KrugerandManuel, supra note 14, was unanimous.
Supra note 118.
202
Id.
20
3 Supranote 8, at 704 (S.C.R.), 560-61 (D.L.R.), 8 (C.C.C.).
2
04 By "autonomy", it is meant the autonomy constitutional principles accord each
of government within its designated jurisdiction.
level 205
Supranote 8.
206
Supranote 39.
207
Supranote 4.
208
Supra note 109.
209 Supranote 118.

210 30-31 Vict., c. 3 as am. by item I of Sched. to the ConstitutionAct, 1982, Sched.
B of the CanadaAct1982, 1982, c. II (U.K.).
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Ultimately, we are faced with a choice between two values: maintenance
of the integrity of our federal system or decent treatment for our minority
groups. One might be tempted to forego the first to some extent if the second
were enhanced; or, in other words, to tolerate some diminishing of provincial
power if that would lead to greater protection of native rights. In fact,
however, allowing the federal government an extremely broad scope of action
in regard to Indians and Reserves is no guarantee of protection for native
rights. Constitutionally, the federal government has been able to derogate
from rights and practically, it has done so. 211 It is to be hoped that the Constitution Act, 1982212 will serve to put a brake on legislation emanating from
either level of government, federal or provincial, which threatens traditional
rights and protections to which Indians can lay claim. Until then, it is submitted that a constriction of provincial competence through the characterization
principles discussed in this paper as they have been applied in the Courts and
as they have the potential to be applied, is not justified by any benefits which
are purported to have accrued to native peoples and reserves as a consequence
213
of that constriction.

211See, e.g., Danielsv. White, [1968] S.C.R. 517, 2 D.L.R. (3d) 1, [1969] 1 C.C.C.
299. Five members of the Supreme Court held that s. 13 of the Natural Resources
Agreement between Manitoba and the federal government, guaranteeing Indians the
right to hunt for food on unoccupied Crown land in all seasons (the same provision is
s. 12 of the Alberta Natural Resources Agreement which appears in Cardinal,supra
note 8), did not exempt Daniels from compliance with the federal MigratoryBirds Convention Act R.S.C. 1952, c. 179, now R.S.C. 1970, c. M-12.
212
Sched. B of the CanadaAct 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).
21
3No particular benefits are in mind here. Exemption from provincial game laws
(as in R. v. Isaac, supra note 104) might legitimately be considered a benefit, but it is
difficult to place exemption from zoning, serves requirements and health standards (as
in Peace Arch, supra note 118) in that category, unless it is considered to be in the Indians' long-term interest to be exempt from provincial standards applicable to the rest
of the province.

